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Is Nominal Use an Answer to the
Free Speech and Right of Publicity Quandary?:
Lessons from America's National Pastime
Raymond Shih Ray Ku

INTRODUCTION

From its inception, the right of pUblicity has existed in an uneasy state
of tension with the First Amendment. By prohibiting the use of an individ
ual's name or likeness, the right of publicity ·like other categories of intel
lectual property law, including copyright and trademark---creates a proper
ty right in information that may be asserted by its owner to restrict the
expression of others. I By definition, laws that limit expression implicate
the First Amendment's prohibition against the abridgment of speech, even
if this does not mean that all such limitations are unconstitutionaL As the
Supreme Court has noted, some restrictions upon speech imposed by intel
lectual property law promote freedom of expression. 2 Not surprisingly, this
tension between free speech and intellectual property laws in general , and
the right of publicity in paJiicular, has been a source of continuing conster
nation for COUlis 3 and commentators alike. 4
• Professor of Law, Co-Director Center for Law, Technology & the Arts, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law. I would liKe to thank the editors of the Chapman Law Review for inviting
me to the symposium, for the hospitality they showed during the symposium, and for their excellent
work preparing this at1icle for publication.
I See RESTATEM ENT (THIRD) OF UN FAIR COM PET] IlON § 46 (1995) ("One who appropriates the
commerci al value of a person' s identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other
indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability .... 'J
2 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. "!ation Lnter,., 471 1.. S. 539, 558 (1985) ("In our haste
to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the en
gine offree express ion.").
J See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co, 433 lS. 562 (1977); ITW Corp. v. Jireh
Publ' g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League !3aseball Players Ass ' n, 95
F. 3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 PJd 797 (Cal. 2001); Pa
ves ich v. New England Life Ins. Co, 50 S.L 68 (Ga 1905); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d. 363
(Mo. 2003) (en bane).
4 See, e. g , Pamela :;amucison, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right
of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 [1'L L R1V. 836 (1983); Roberta Rosenthai Kwall, Fame , 73
IND. L.J. I (1997); Diane Le~nheer Zimmerman, Filling Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and
Free Speech Theol)'. Sam. You J'v/ade the Pants Too Long', 10 DEPA UL-LCA J ART & ENT. L. 283
(2000); Eugene VoJokh, Freedom oj Speech and the Right oj Puhlicity, 40 HouS . L REV. 903 (2004);
F. Jay Dou gherty, All the World's Not a Stooge: The "Transformativeness" Test/or Analyzing a First
Amendment Defense to a Right oj Puhlicily Claim .'lgains/ Distribution ofa Work of Art, 27 COLUM .
J L & ARTS J (2003); Shubha Gosh, On Bobbling [-Ieuds. Paparazzi, and Juslice Hugo Black, 45
SANTA CLARA L REV. 61'7 (2005); llavid S. Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, The Terminator as Eraser:
Ho w Arnold Schwarzenegger Used the Right oj PubliCity to Terminate Non-De/amatory Political
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One fac tor that complicates this tension is that, as it has evolved, the
right of publicity does not respond to a single interest, but instead responds
to a cluster of related though distinct interests, each raising di fferent First
Amendment questions. The least controversial of these interests is when
the courts prevent unauthorized use of an individual ' s name or likeness in a
manner that falsely signals endorsement or sponsorship .s False speech is
generally not constitutionally protected speech .6 A little more controversial
is protecting individuals from being unwillingly thrust into the public eye
for commercial purposes.7 In these types of cases, an individual' s interest
in liberty and dignity may be said to outweigh the speech interests at stake,S
though the Supreme Court has generally been skeptical of restrictions upon
the dissemination of truthful information. 9 Lastly, the right of publicity
protects the economic interests of an individual from having her name or
likeness exploited even when there is no confusion regarding the individu
ai' s re lationship with the use. IO
This essay explores three approaches developed by courts to all eviate
the tension between free speech and the right of publicity. It focuses upon
the last set of interests- non-misleading, for-profit uses of a celebrity's
name or likeness. Perhaps by coincidence-~)f, perhaps because it is this
nati on's pastime- professional baseball is fertile ground for these contro
versies. Not only does the modern right of publicity begin with a dispute
over baseball cards, its future should be defined by fantasy baseball. In
CB.C Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Ad
vanced Media , L. P., the Eighth Circuit held that the use of players ' names
and statistics for onli ne fantasy baseball did not violate the right of publici
ty. lI The court used an approach that not only reconciled the speech inte r
ests at stake in that case, but also adopted an essential First Amendment sa
feguard present in trademark law- nominal use- that has yet to be
explicitly recognized in the right of publicity context.
I. PLAY BA LL ! OR NOT

From the beginning, courts have recognized the inherent tension be
tween one person' s right not to be spoken about and another's constitution
al guarantee of freedom of expression. After tracing the origi ns of the right
of publicity, thi s part discusses how courts haw: attempted to balance these
Speech , 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 65 1 (2005)
5 See, e.g. , PoV(!sich, 50 S. E. 68.
6 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sulli va n, 376 U.S. 254 ( 1964).
7 See, e.g .. Pa vesich, 50 S.E. 68 .
8 [d. ; see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The RighI to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193( 1890)
9 See, e.g, Bartni cki v. Vopper, 532 U. S. 5 14 (200 1).
10 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNF AIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995) ('The name, lik eness, and
other indicia ofa person's identity are used 'for purposes of trade' ... if they are used in advert isin g th e
user' s goods or servi ces, or pl aced on merchan di se marketed by th e user, or are used in co nnection with
services rendered by the user. ").
II 505 F.3d 8 18 (Sth Cif. 2007) .
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competing mtere·sts. Through the Jens of the three cases involving the right
of publicity and baseball , it demonstrates the limits and promise of these
efforts.
The right of publicity originates from Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis' seminal article, The Right to Privacy. 12 Responding to what they
perceived to be the abuses of "modem" media, the authors argued that the
common law recognized a "right to be let alone." 13 Drawing from common
copyright, which recognized a property right in one's unpublished papers,
including letters and manuscripts, The Right to Privacy argued that the law
protects the ''[tJhoughts, emotions, and sensations" that make up one's per
sonality.14 As such, the law should provide "to each individual the right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emo
tions shall be communicated to othcrs[,] " regardless of how these aspects
of one' s personality are expressed. 15
To do this , Th e Right tu Privacy de-linked the protected attributes of
personality from the physical pieces of property protected by the common
law that provided evidence of that personality. 16 According to the authors:
The circumstancl; that a thought or emotion has been recorded in a pennanent
form renders its identification easier, and hence may be important from the point
of view of evidence, but it has no significance as a matter of substantive right. If,
then, the dt:cisions indi cate a general right to privacy for thou ghts, emotions, and
sensations , these should receive th e same protection , wheth(;r expressed in writ
ing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitud(;s, or in facial expression. 17

However, even Warren and Brandeis recognized that the right of pri
vacy is not absolute and would not prohibit, among other things, "any pub
lication of matter which is of public or general interest[,],,1 8 or apply to
facts published by the individual or with her consent. 19 The authors, there
fore, emphasized that "Ii]t is the unwarranted invasion of individual priva
cy which is reprehended, and to be, so far as possible, prevented.,,2o
Warren and Brandeis's onginal conception of the right of privacy is il
lustrated by Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance CO}I one of the ear
liest decisions recognizing the right. In Pavesich, the plaintiff complained
that the unauthorized use of his photograph in conjunction with an adver
tisement for life insurance violated his right to privacy.22 The advertise

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8.
Id.
14 Id at 195,206- 07
15 Id. at 198.
16 See Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis.' Privacy. Property, and Appropriation,
41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647 ( 1991).
17 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 206.
18 Id. at 214.
19 Id. at 218.
2old. at215.
2 1 50 S.E. 68 (Ga 1905).
22 lei. at 68- 69.
12

13
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ment used the plaintiffs image alongside a picture of an ill-looking indi
vidual in conjunction with statements supposedly from those pi ctured about
the value of buying insurance while in good health. 23 In rejecting the de
fendant ' s free speech claim, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that,
"Lt]here is in the publication of one's picture for advertising purposes not
the slightest semblance of an expression of an idea, a thought, or an opi
nion, within the meaning of the constitutional provision which guaranties to
a person the right to publish his sentiments on any subj ect. "24 Instead, it
was a serious assault on individual liberty . According to the court, the u n
authorized use of one's image in advertising is the equivalent of slavery:
The knowledge that one's features and form are being used for such a purpose,
and displayed in such places as such advertisements are often liable to be found,
brings ... even the individual of ordinary sensibility, to a realization that his li
berty has been taken away from him; ... that he is for the time being under the
control of another, that he is no lon ger free , and that he is in reality a slave.. 2S

As ~uch, the court established a rule that "the pUblication of one' s pic
ture without his consent by another as an advertisemen', for the mere pur
pose of increasing the profits and gains of the advertiser. is an invasion of
[the right of privacy] ...."26 Because the plaintiff never consented to the
public use of his image, Pavesich is a rather straightforward application of
Warren and Brandeis ' s right of privacy.
Given the scope of the right of privacy, how did it develop into the
right of publicity, or what William Prosser described as " [a]ppropriati on,
for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name or likeness"?27 In
other words, how did a right to prevent the disclosure of one ' s personal
thoughts and emotions become a right to control the use of one' s public
image? As we will see, the ceiling established by the right of privacy be
comes the floor for the right of publicity. What develops out of the concl u
sion that the ~ight of privacy is constrained by expression involving matters
of public concern- subsequently described as newsworthy- is the corol
lary that when the expression is not newsworthy it is not privileged. As
Diane Zimmerman notes:
If a use of a celebrity' s identity occurs in a "newsworthy" ;;etting, the use does
not, all concede, v iolate any property right. But matters quickly go awry because
the flip-side ass umption seems to be th at if a use is not newsworthy, it mu st pe r
force be comm erci a l. And if it is commercial, then it does not have a hrs(
Amendment dim ension and is fair game for regulation 2 8

To illustrate this point, consider the following decisions involving the

Id.
!d. at 80.
Id.
26 ld. at 81.
27 William j .. Prosse r, Pri vacy, 48 CAL. I REV . 383, 389 ( 1960 ) (identifyin g four different cate
gori es o f pri vacy-rdatcd torts, inc luding mi sa ppropriation).
28 Zimmennan , supra note 4 , at 295 (citations o mitted ).
23

24
25
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right of publicity claims of baseball players.
The first case, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
established the modem right of pUblicity.29 Haelan involved the consen
sual usc of photographs of baseball players by competing chewing gum
manufacturers in connection with the sale of gum. 30 The plaintiff, Haelan,
alleged that, not only had the ball players consented to the use of their pho
tographs for such purposes; they also agreed not to grant similar rights to
any other gum manufacturer. 31 In response, the defendant, Topps, argued
that the right of privacy was a personal right and could not be assigned to
plaintiff and, us such, the players' agreements represented nothing more
than a release of liability under New York's statutory right of privacy and
did not create a separately enforceable interest. 32 Because Topps also ob
tained the players' consent, the players had no grounds for complaint.:\1 In
deciding for the plaintiff, Judge Jerome Frank concluded that, "in addition
to and independent of that right of privacy. . a man has a right in the pub
licity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege
of publishing his picture .. . ."34 According to Judge Frank:
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is common knowledge
that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having
their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel
sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses,
trains and subway~. This right of pUblicity would usually yield them no money
unless it could be mad e the su bject of an exclusive grant which barred any other
advertiser from using th<.:ir pictures 35

Chief Judge Swan concurred on the basis that the case should be re
manded on the claim that Topps intentionally induced the players to breach
their contracts with Haelan.36
While Haelan is important for its recognition and defense of the right
of publicity, for this discussion the decision is more important for what it
does not address. Consider the fact that the majority's discussion regarding
the right of publicity is arguably dicta. As Chief Judge Swan concluded,
the case could have been resolved under basic contract principles, and did
not require the establishment of an independent property right. ]? Further
more, Judge Frank's concem that, without the right of publicity, ball play
ers would make no money from advertising,38 is not only unsupported by
29

202 Ud 866 (2d (ir. 195 3).

30 Idat86~.
31

lei

Id.
'[,here was some s ugg~stion that Topps mal not have obtained the consent of one player, al
though thi ", fact did not impac t thc Courl 's analysis. Id. at 868.
34 ld.
32
33

35

Id.

36

lei at 869 (Swan, .I ., concurring).

37

See id.

38 Id.

at 868 (majority op inion).
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the facts of the case, it is far from inevitable. Topps did not argue that the
right of priV(lcy did not entitle the players to control the use of their photo
graphs, either because: (1) they were public personalities; or (2) because
they already consented to the publication of similar photographs by Haelan.
As such, there was no threat to the players' ability to obtain co mpensation
for the use of their photographs in advertising. The right of privacy guar
anteed them that opportunity (at least to the extent that Topps valued the
players ' cooperation in posing for their photographs). Instead, the problem
was that the players, presumably in exchange for additional compensation,
consented to competing uses of their photographs, despite an earlier prom
ise to Haelan. 39
Moreover, while the baseball cards were di stributed in connection
with the sale of chewing gum, the players' photographs were not used spe
cifically to advertise gum. Yet, there is no discussion whether the differ
ences between baseball cards and advertising require a separate First
Amendment analysis (perhaps becaus~ the defendant was a competing
chewing gum manufacturer rather than a member of the press). Even if one
agrees with Pavesich that unauthorized uses of one ' s likeness in advertising
is akin to slaverY,4o that does not mean that the use of the players ' photo
graphs on baseball cards is the same. Lastly, while one might ultimately
conclude that, for First Amendment purposes, promotional uses that en
courage the sale of an unrelated product are equivalent to advertising, the
question does not even arise in Haelan. Instead, in response to competing
commercial uses, the court almost reflexively recognizes a property interest
in the player's image disconnected from the dignitary harms associated
with the right of publicity and in opposition to the players ' own actions. 4 1
The court does this without any consideration of the First Amendment in
terests at stake. 42 In Haelan , freedom of speech, literally, is not an issue.
The next decision in the baseball trilogy, Cardtoons, L. e. v. Major
League Baseball Players' Ass 'n,43 illustrates how courts have responded to
First Amendment concerns after Haelan. Under this approach, defendants
must justify their use of celebrity images and demonstrate that the use is
sufficiently important to society to outweigh the right of pUblicity. 44 In
Cardtoons, the defendant produced humorous trading cards that featured
caricatures of major league baseball players, including Barry Bonds , who
was called "Treasury Bonds.,,4< The cards ridiculed the players for, among

W

See id. at 867.

40

Pavesich v, ,New England Lil(; In s, Co" SO S,E, 68. 80 (Ga, 1905).

41

See Hae/an, 202 F,2d at 868,
See id,
95 F.3d 959 (J Oth Cir. J996) ,

42

43

Jd at 972, Thi s approach follow s th e Supreme Court' s treatment of th e subject in Zacchini \"
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co" in which the COUl1 held that th e First Am endm en t did not preclude a light
of pUblicity when th~ new" m"dia broadcasted the plaintiffs' entire performance, 433 U,S, 562 (1977 ),
.'j ('ardrool1s, 95 F,3d at 962,
44
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other things , their compensati on, egos, and physical characteristics. 46 The
Maj or League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), the exclusive col
lective bargaining agent for all active major league baseball players,
claimed that the cards violated the players' rights against false representa
tion under the Lanham Act and the right of pUblicity.47 Because the cards
did not fall within the statutory exception for news, Cardtoons' use of the
players' likenesses would be prohibited by Oklahoma ' S right of publicity
statute, unless it could successfully assert a First Amendment defense. 48
If a newsworthy use of celebrity images is one talismanic category of
protected speech, Cardtoons establishes parody as another. According to
the court, the trading cards implicate "some of the core concerns of the
First Amendment. ,,49 In explaining the value of parody, the court noted:
A parodi st can, w ith deft and wit, readil y l:Xposc: the foolish and absurd in socie
ty. Parody is also a valuable form of ,elf-expression that allows artists to shed
light on earlier work s and , at the same time, cr(;ate new ones . Thus, parody, both
as soc ial criticism and a mea ns of self-expression, is a vital commodity in th(;
marketplace of ideas 5 0

Because of their significance in society, celebrities are both appropri
ate targets and vehicles for such social criticism. 51 And, in the absence of
First Amendment protection, celebrities are not likely to license or consent
to such uses, thus depriv ing the public of important, if not core, First
Amendment expressi on. 52
Correspondingly, the court concluded that recognizing a first
Amendment privilege for celebrity parodies did little to harm the interests
protected by the right of publicity. 53 The court reasoned:
The right is tho ught to further economic goals such as stimulating athletic and ar
tistic achievement, promoting the efficient allocation of resources, and protecting
consumers. In addition , the right of public ity is said to protect various non
economic inte rests, such as safeguarding natural rights, securing the fruits of ce
le brity labors, preventing unjust ennchm(;nt, and av(;rting emotional harm. 54

The court concluded that, given the impOltance of parody as social
commentary and criticism, none of these interests were of sufficient weight
to justify restricting the parody baseball cards. ';5
With regard to the economic justifications, the court concluded that
the parodies are unlikely to change the incentives for people to become

50

at 963 .
!d. at 966.
[d at 968.
[d. at 9'72.
Id.

5l

See id

46 Id.
47

48

49

(" Ind eed, the director of licensing for MLBPA testified that MLBPA would never license a
parody which poked fun at the pl ayers.").
53 Id. at 976.
54 [d. at 973.
55 Id. at 976.
52 [d.
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baseball players. 56 In the words of the court, "it is unlikely that little leagu
ers will stop dreaming of the big leagues or major leaguers will start 'dog
ging it' to first base if MLBPA is denied the right to control the use of its
members' identities in parody."5- Likewise, non-adveliising uses of celebr
ity images were not likely to reduce the value of that likeness, and argua
bly, may increase that value. 58 As such, the right of pUblicity wou ld not he
used to maximize value, but, instead, to suppress criticism and "permanent
ly remove a valuable source of information about their identity from the
marketplace."59 Lastly, the baseball cards w(,re not likely to confuse or
deceive consumers.60
With regard to the non-economic justifications, the court rejected the
natural rights argument out of hand as nothing more than a "blind appeal[ ]
to first principles ...."61 In response to the claim that celebrities are en
titled to the fruits of their labor, it noted that celebrities "are often not full y
responsible for their fame."62 Moreover, with regard to parody, this was an
untenable argument that celebrities should "enjoy the fruits of socially un
desirable behavior."63 Lastly, the court rejected the argument that the right
of publicity may be used to prevent emotional injuries because, unlike the
right of privacy, publicity rights focus upon the loss of financial gain (,4
According to the court, "fame is a double-edged sword- the law cannot al
low those who enjoy the public limelight to so easily avoid the ridicule and
criticism that sometimes accompany public prominence."65 One may dis
agree with the court's balancing or conclude that the court's analysis was
driven by its perception of the importance of parody as a form of social
criticism. Nonetheless, Cardtoons is illustrative of efforts to resolve First
Amendment concerns in right of publicity cases by determining whether
the unauthorized use as speech is valuable speech or, as Warren and Bran
deis put it, "in the public interest."66
The final dispute in the baseball trilogy arose out of the operation of
fantasy baseball leagues. The defendant, e.B.e. Distribution and Market
ing ("eBC") sold fantasy baseball products through the Internet that in
cluded the names, performance, and biographical data of actual major
league baseball players.67 These products allowed individuals to become
56

57

58
59
60
61
62

63
64

Id. at 973- 74.
Id. at 974.
Id. at 975.
Id.
!d
Id.

Id.
Id. at 975- 76.
!d at 976.

!d
See Wan'en & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 214 and accompanying text. The California Supreme
Court subsequently relied upon Cardloons and followed this balancing analysi s when it concluded that
'·transfonnative" expression outweighs a celebrity's interest in the control of her name or likeness. See
Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc, 2 I PJd 797, 809 (Cal 2001)
67 C. B.C. Distribution & Mktg., inc. v. \1ajor League Baseball Advanced Media, [P .. 505 1-.3d
65
66
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fantasy "owners" of a baseball franchise by creating their own teams and
competing against the teams of other "owners" based upon the actual per
formance statistics of the ball players.68 The participants in these leagues
paid fees to play and additional fees to trade players.69 Initially, C.B.C. li
censed the use of the players' names and information. 70 However, when
that licensi ng agreement expired, MLBPA licensed the exclusive right to
use that information to Major League Baseball, which began offering its
own fantasy baseball products and services through its website,
MLB.com.71 In response, C.Re. filed a declaratory judgment action to de
termine the legality of continuing to operate its fantasy games. 72
While both the district court and the court of appeals ul timately fol
lowed the balancing approach illustrated by Cardtvons , concluding that
there is a substantial public interest in discussing our Nation's pastime,:]
the case raises the tantalizing possibility of avoiding balancing altogether.
Fundamental to the district court's analysis, and central to the court of ap
peals ' analys is, is the point that CoB.Co used the identities of the baseball
players as facts and facts arc not subject to intellectual property rights.'74
For example, the district court concludes that C.B.C. used the players'
names as facts rather than "as symbol[s] of their identit[ies]," as required
by Missouri law. 75 And, as facts, the players' names and performance sta
tistics were part of information already in the public domain. 76 Similarly,
the court of appeals concluded that, "the 'recitation and discussion of fac
tual data concerning the athletic performance of [players] command a sub
stantial public interest, and, therefore, is a form of expression due substan
tial constitutional protection.",77 Moreover, "the facts in this case barely, if
at all, implicate the interests that states typically intend to vindicate by pro
viding rights of publicity to individuals."78

CB.C is intriguing for several reasons. First, it hints at an altcrnative
approac h for resol ving the tension between free speech and the right of
publicity by distinguishing between factual uses of names versus publicity
uses, for lack of a better term. Unfortunately, the opinions do not readily
explain how so-called factual uses of names differ from other uses typically
contro lled by the right of publicity.-9 The court of appeals appeared con
8 18, 820 (8th Cir 200 7 ).
68 fd at 820 2 I .
69 fd at 821.
70 Id
71 fd
72 Id
73 lei at 823; 443 J" ~;urp. 2d 107~ , 1096 (E.D. \;lo. 2006).
74 505 F.3 d at 823; 443 I. Supp 2d at 110 I.
75 CB.C ,443 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
76 fd at 1095.
77 CB.C , 50 5 F.3d at 823- 24 (quoting Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, [ [4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
307, 3 [ 5 (Ct. App. 200 I) (brackets in original)). Ironically, Gionji'iddo concluded that Major League
Baseball's p romotional use of ball-playws' names and likenesses did not violate their publicity rights.
78 fd at 824.
79 See infi'(/ Part It.
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fused on this very point when it criticized the district court. stating:
We think that by reasoning that "identity," rather than " mere use of a name," "is
a critical element of the right of publicity," the district court did not understand
that when a name alone is sufficient to establish identity, the defendant ' s use of
that name satisfies the plaintiff's burden to show that a name was used as a sym
bol of identity80

Apparently, the court of appeals missed the point. As discussed in
Part II, this distinction makes sense because the district court did not c1cim
that a name cannot be used to identify an individual, but that C.B.C. was
using the names and statistics descriptively. 8) In other words. C.B.C. iden
tified the players, but did not exploit their legally protected identities.
Second, the appellate court's reference to the public's interest JI1 base
ball does little to address the fact that C.B.C. was not using celebrity im
ages to report the news or as social commentary. Under a Cardtoons ba
lancing approach, the focus would be on how the information was used in
expression (i.e., news, parody, or social criticism) rather than the topic of
that expression (i.e., politics, sports, or enteltainment). In CB.C , the play
ers' names and information were used to make C.B.C. 's game more appeal 
ing to customers,sz C.B .C. could have provided a game using fictional
names and statistics, but it preferred to use actual names and statistics. s3
As such, MLBPA's argument that C.B.C. used the players' names and per
formances to enhance the value of C.B.C. 's fantasy baseball products and
services, and that it would be unfair to aJlow C.B.C. to profit from that val
ue without compensating the players, is not so easily dismissed by labeling
C.B.C.'s use as factual. However, for the reasons discussed in Part II, the
approach taken in CB. C is analogou~ to the nominal use defense in trade
mark law and represents a valuable development for the right of publicity.

II.

NOMIJ\AL USL FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

The tension between freedom of speech and intellectual property is
not unique to the right of publicity. The conflict between laws that regulate
expression, and a constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, exists
in trademark and copyright law as wel1. 84 And, while both trademark and
copyright law recognize fair use as a defense, they also protect freedom of
expression through "definitional balancing.'·~5 In other words, these laws

CB.C, 505 FJd at 822.
See inFa Part II.
8' See C B.C, 505 FJd at 822- 23.
83 See id. at 822.
84 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, F{!)ee Expression? Reconciling Copyright Ilnd the First Amend
II/ent, 58 CASE W. RES. L REV. (forthcoming 2008) (discussin.l' copyright's interna l mechanism for
balancing copyright and free speech); Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Reg u
lalion, 58 S.c. L. REV. 737 (2007) (discussing the ways in which trademark law and tile First Amend
ment differ in approach); see generally Mark A. Lemley, The iv/adem Lanham Act and th e Dl!ath of
Common Sense, 108 YAU 1.1. 1687 (1999).
85 See Ku , supra note 84 (discussing the origins and limits of definitional balancing); see also
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
80
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seek to reduce the tension between free speech and intellectual property
rights , not only by making an exception for unauthorized expression that is
valuable, but by concluding that certain expression is not part of the proper
ty right to begin with. In copyright law, this can be found in the
idea/expression dichotomy, which limits copyright protection to how an au
thor expresses ideas and not the ideas themselves. 86 In trademark law, de
finitional balancing is found in the requirement of trademark use, which
limits liability to circumstances in which a defendant uses the trademark as
a trademark. As the following argues, CB.C represents an effort to bring
definitional balancing to the right of publicity and is analogous to the no
minati ve use of trademarks as established by the Ninth Circuit's decision in
New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc. 8"

New Kids involved a right of publicity claim brought by the musical
act, New Kids on the Block, against two newspapers that conducted reader
polls.88 These polls asked readers to call 900-numbers to answer: " Which
one of the New Kids is the most popular?,,89 and "Now which kid is the
sexiest?,,9o Readers who called in were charged "50 cents" and "95 cents
per minute," respectively.91 The New Kids sold "posters, T-shirts, badges,
coffee mugs and the like" and also offered 900-numbers for fans to call and
listen to the New Kids themselves and other fans as a means of generating
income in addition to their musical act. 92 They claimed that the newspa
pers' use of the New Kids violated their trademark rights protected under
the Lanham Act, or, essentially, that the papers were "free-riding" on the
New Kids' mark.93 As the cOUli noted, this "free-riding" is considered un
fair because it represents something akin to fraud , and also because, "by
using a rival's mark, the infringer capitalizes on the investment of time,
money and resources of his competitor. . .,,94 The newspapers claimed
that the First Amendment protected their use as a form of newsgathering. 95
Instead of reaching the First Amendment issue, the court chose instead
to resolve the matter on non-constitutional, trademark law grounds. 96 In
itially, the court emphasized both the importance of trademark law in pre
venting unfair competition and, at the same time, the concern that tradePress?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180, 1189- 93 (1970) (discussing the importance of definitiona l balancing);
Robert C. Den icola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Ex
pression, 67 CAL. L. REV . 283,293- 99 (1979) (discuss ing the importance of fair use in definitional ba
lancin g).
86 See Ni mmer, supra note 85, at 1189- 93 (discussing the importance of definiti onal balancing
through the idea/express ion dichotomy) .
87 971 F. 2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992)
S8 ld. at 304.
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mark law not unduly deplete the English language of words, phrases, or
symbols.97 According to the court, trademark law express ly addresses the
latter concern in two ways. First, trademark law deni es protection to marks
that are~ or become, generic. As the court describes, " [w ]hen a trademark
comes to describe a class of goods rather than an individual product, the
courts will hold as a elatter of law that use of that mark does not imp ly
sponsorship or endorsement .... "98 Second, "when a trademark also de
scribes a person, u place or an attribute of a product[,]" the law den ies pro
tection where the "mark is used only 'to describe the goods or . . . services
. . . . ",99 The newspapers' use of New Kids, however, did not squarely fit
either category. The New Kids were not generic, nor did the papers use
their trademark to describe the papers' own product. 100
Nonetheless, the court concluded that it should recogni ze a related de
fense for nominative uses of a mark. 101 According to the court:
[SJometimes there is no descriptive substitute [for a mark], and a problem closely
related to genericity and descriptiveness is presented when many goods and se r
vices are effectively identifiable only by their trademarks. For example, one
might refer to "the two-time world champions" or "the profess ional basketball
learn from Chicago," but it's far simpler (and more likely to be undr:rstood) to re
I02
fer to the Chicago Bulls.

Use of a trademark under these circumstances is "best understood as
involving a non-trademark use of a mark- a use to which the infringement
laws simply do not apply ...."103 To accommodate these nominative uses,
the court established a three-part test. Under this test, a commercial user
would be entitled to use another's trademark without authorizati on if: (1 )
" [T]he product or service in question .. . [is] one not read ily identifiable
without use of the trademark;" 104 (2) "only so much of the mark or marks is
used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or serv ice;"los and
(3) "the user does nothing that would, in conjunction wi th the mark, sug
gest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder." 106
In New Kids, the newspapers' use of the band' s trademark sati sfied all
three elements. 107 The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that
the newspapers were also making money separately from thei r newsgather
ing function, arguably in direct competition with 900-numbers offered by
the band. 108 According to the court, because the newspapers did not use the
97

98
99

100

Jd at 305-06.
ld at 306.
Id (quoting 15 L.S.< § 11IS(b)(4))
Id. at 308.

1011dat309.
102 ld at 306.
103
104

Id. at 30-.
Id at 308.

105 ld
106

107
108

Id.
Jd.
Id. at 309.

Lessons from America's National Pastime

2008]

447

band's trademark in a manner that implied sponsorship or endorsement,
"trademark laws do not give the New Kids the right to channel their fans'
enthusiasm (and dollars) only into items licensed or authorized by them.,,109
As recently suggested by Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, the right of pub
\icity could learn a great deal from trademark law. 110
Initially, the parallels between the right of publicity and trademark law
should be readily apparent. Both grant individuals control over certain uses
of words, images, and symbols, and both are justified, at least in part, on
the basis of preventing consumer confusion and unjust enrichment. I 11 Si
milarly, the parallels between C.B.C and New Kids should also be appar
ent. In both cases, the unauthorized users were profiting from using the
protected mark and names at issue, and yet both were found to be non
infringing.1l2 In CB. C, the court focused upon the factual nature of the
use of ball player names, while New Kids recognized an exception for no
minative uses of trademarks. As discussed earlier, it was not immediately
apparent why the factual nature of the use should matter. New Kids, how
ever, sheds some light on CB. C if one considers it an attempt at defini
tional balancing akin to nominative use in trademark law.
As discussed in Part II, the district court originally concluded that
MLBPA could not raise a right of publicity claim because C.B.C. used the
players' names as facts rather than "as symbols of their identities."113 Un
der those circumstances, C.B.C. 's use of ball player names and statistics
can be equated with the nominative use at issue in New Kids. C.B.C. used
the ball player names to describe the individuals who took part in Major
League Baseball and how they performed. They were not being put to
"publicity usc" (i.e., "lending" their hard earned credibility and reputation
to the promotion of C.B.C.'s fantasy baseball products and services). In
other words, the factual nature of ball players' names is not decisive. Ball
player names (and trademarks) are facts and would remain facts even if
used as part of false advertising, but few would suggest that the factual na
ture of such names and symbols should preclude liability when used in the
context of false endorsement. Rather, C.B.C. 's use was decisive, even if
some of the value of their products and services could be attributed to the
use of real rather than fictional names and statistics. C.B.C., like the news
papers in New Kids, put the names to nominative use. As in New Kids, it
can be said that, under these circumstances, the right of publicity does not
give celebrities the right to channel their fans' enthusiasm (and dollars) into
only licensed or authorized products and services.
109

fd

Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Whatlhe RighI of Publicity Can Learnji"Oll1 Trademark
Law, 58 S·IA'·;. L. REV. 1161 (2006).
I I I Id at I 164-65 (drawing the parallels between the right of publicity and trademark law and
suggesting, among other things, that the right of publicity adopt a form of trademark use).
112 Compare CB.C Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) with New Kids, 97 I F.2d 302.
III 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077,1089 (ED. Mo. 2006).
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Additionally, the three-part test of New Kids described above would
be useful in right of publicity cases as well. Courts would permit the use of
a celebrity's name without authorization if: (1) the celebrity in question is
not readily identifiable without use of the person's name or likeness; (2)
only so much of the celebrity's name or likeness is used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the celebrity; and (3) the user does nothing that
would, in conjunction with the celebrity's name or likeness, suggest spon
sorship or endorsement by the celebrity.
Consider how it would apply to the facts of CE.C. First, C.B.C. used
the ball players' names to describe the actual players themselves; and,
while there could be alternative ways to desc ribe them, the players are not
readily identifiable without resorting to their actual names. Second, C. B.C.
used only the names and statistics of the players, which was, arguably, no
more than was reasonably necessary to identify them. Third, C.B.C. did
not use the players' names in any manner that suggested sponsorship or en
dorsement As such, the Ne w Kids test could become a valuable tool for
evaluating unauthori zed uses of celebrity names and likenesses. Moreover,
as a movement towards defin itional balancing in right of publicity cases,
recognizing the privileged status of nominative uses of celebrity names and
likenesses represents an important effort to all eviate the tension between
free speech and the right of publicity.
C ONCLUSI ON

As the baseball cases illustrate, courts have developed three approach
es to the free speech and right of pUblicity conundrum. Traditionally, free
dom of speech was literally not an issue and, subsequently, only an issue
when the speech in question is sufficiently valuable to outweigh a celebri
ty's right to control the use of her name or likeness. The first position is
clearly untenable; the second, undesirable. Freedom of speech is clearl y at
stake when the law limits a speaker' s ability to engage in expression and
having First Amendment protection hang on whether judges believe that
the speech is " valuable," while an improvement, is itself, problematic.
However, as this essay suggests, there is another way. Applying defini
tional balancing to the right of publicity and privileging nominative uses of
celebrity names and likenesses is not only a step towards harmonizing pub
licity rights with both copyright and trademark law; it reduces the tension
between free speech and the right of publicity. When one considers that
the Supreme Court recently upheld copyright' s restrictions upon speech, in
large part because copyright protects free speech through definitiona l ba
lancing and fair LIse (or interest balancing), 114 this approach for the right of
publicity may not only be prudent, but consti tutionally required.

III Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,2 18- 19 (2003) (rej ecting the need to subject copyright to
heightened scrutiny because copyright ha s "its own speech-protective purpooes and safeguards."").

